Understanding Agent Incentives using Causal Influence Diagrams. Part I:
  Single Action Settings by Everitt, Tom et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
09
98
0v
6 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 6 
Se
p 2
01
9
Understanding Agent Incentives using
Causal Influence Diagrams∗
Part I: Single Decision Settings
Tom Everitt Pedro A. Ortega Elizabeth Barnes Shane Legg
September 9, 2019
Deepmind
Agents are systems that optimize an objective function in an environ-
ment. Together, the goal and the environment induce secondary objectives,
incentives. Modeling the agent-environment interaction using causal influ-
ence diagrams, we can answer two fundamental questions about an agent’s
incentives directly from the graph: (1) which nodes can the agent have an
incentivize to observe, and (2) which nodes can the agent have an incentivize
to control? The answers tell us which information and influence points need
extra protection. For example, we may want a classifier for job applications
to not use the ethnicity of the candidate, and a reinforcement learning agent
not to take direct control of its reward mechanism. Different algorithms and
training paradigms can lead to different causal influence diagrams, so our
method can be used to identify algorithms with problematic incentives and
help in designing algorithms with better incentives.
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1. Introduction
Agents strive to optimize an objective function in an environment. This gives them
incentives to learn about and influence various aspects of the environment. For example,
a reinforcement learning agent playing the ATARI game Pong will have an incentive to
direct the ball to regions where the opponent will be unable to intercept it, and have an
incentive to learn which those regions are. The aim of this paper is to provide a simple
and systematic method for inferring agent incentives. To this end, we define causal
influence diagrams (CID), a graphical model with special decision, utility, and chance
nodes (Howard and Matheson, 1984), where all arrows encode causal relationships (Pearl,
2009). CIDs provide a flexible and precise tool for simultaneously describing both agent
objectives and agent-environment interaction.
To determine what information a system wants to obtain in order to optimize its
objective, we establish a graphical criterion that characterizes which nodes in a CID
graph are compatible with an observation incentive. In words, the criterion is that:
Main result 1 (Observation incentives): A single-decision CID graph
is compatible with an observation incentive on a node X if and only if X is
d-connected to a influenceable utility node when conditioning on the decision
and all available observations (Theorem 9).
The criterion applies to a conceptually clear definition of observation incentive, which
says that there is an incentive to observe a node if learning its outcome strictly improves
expected utility, i.e. if the node provides a positive value of information (Howard, 1966).
Among other things, the criterion detects which observations are useful or requisite
when making a decision. Theorems establishing the only if part of observation incentive
criterion have been previously established by Fagiuoli and Zaffalon (1998) and Lauritzen
and Nilsson (2001); see Section 5 for a more detailed overview. Here, we also prove the
if direction.
A related question is what aspects of its environment a system wants to influence.
To answer this question, we establish an analogous graphical criterion for intervention
incentives:
Main result 2 (Intervention incentives): A single-decision CID graph
is compatible with an intervention incentive on a non-decision node X if and
only if there is a directed path from X to a utility node after all nonrequisite
information links have been removed (Theorem 14).
Intervention incentives detect a positive value of control (Heckerman and Shachter, 1995;
Matheson and Matheson, 2005; Shachter and Heckerman, 2010) or value of intervention
(Lu and Druzdzel, 2002). No graphical criterion of intervention incentives has previously
been established. Depending on the path from X to the utility node, we can make
a further distinction between whether the intervention on X is used to obtain more
information or to directly control a utility variable.
We demonstrate two applications of our theorems. The observation incentive criterion
provides insights about the fairness of decisions made by machine learning systems and
2
other agents (O’Neill, 2016), as it informs us when a variable is likely to be used as a proxy
for a sensitive attribute or not (Section 3.4). With the intervention incentive criterion,
we study the incentive of a question-answering system (QA-system) to influence the
world state with its answer, rather than passively predicting future events (Section 4.4).
Many more applications of CIDs are provided by Everitt and Hutter (2019) and Everitt
et al. (2019).
Outline. Following an initial background section (Section 2), we devote one section to
observation incentives (Section 3) and one section to intervention incentives (Section 4).
These sections contain formal sections defining the criteria, as well as “gentler” sec-
tions describing how to use and interpret the criteria. Both sections conclude with an
example application: to fairness for observation incentives, and to QA-system for inter-
vention incentives. Finally, we discuss related work (Section 5) and some open questions
(Section 6), before stating some conclusions in Section 7. All proofs are deferred to Ap-
pendix B. A second part of the paper extends the graphical criteria to influence diagrams
with multiple actions and agents (Everitt et al., forthcoming).
2. Background
This section provides the necessary background and notation for the rest of the paper.
A recap of causal graphs (Section 2.1) and d-separation (Section 2.2) is followed by a
definition of CIDs (Section 2.3).
2.1. Causal Graphs
Random Variables. A random variable is a (measurable) function X : Ω → dom(X)
from some measurable space (Ω,Σ) to a finite domain dom(X). The domain dom(X)
specifies which values the random variable can take. The outcome of a random variable
X is x.
A set or vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) of random variables is again a random variable,
with domain dom(X) =
∏n
i=1 dom(Xi). We will use boldface font for sets of random
variables (e.g. X).
Graphs and models. Throughout the paper we will make a distinction between graphs
on the one hand, and models on the other. A graph only specifies the structure of the
interaction, while a model combines a graph with a parameterization to also define the
relationships between the variables.
Definition 1 (Causal graph; Pearl, 2009). A causal graph is a directed acyclic graph
(W , E) over a set of nodes or random variables W , connected by edges E ⊆ W ×W .
The arrows indicate the direction of causality, in the sense that an external intervention
on a node X will affect the descendants of X, but not the ancestors of X. We denote the
parents of X with PaX . Following the conventions for random variables, the outcomes
of the parent nodes are denoted paX .
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Alarm
Burglar Earthquake
Security
calls
Figure 1: An example of a causal graph (Pearl, 2009).
For example, in Figure 1, an alarm is influenced by the presence of a burglar and
by a (small) earthquake, and in turn influences whether the security company calls.
The graph defines the structure of the interaction, but does not specify the relationship
between the variables. As in a Bayesian network, the precise relationships are specified
by conditional probability distributions P (x | paX).
Definition 2 (Causal model; Pearl, 2009). A causal model (W , E, P ) is a causal graph
(W , E) combined with a parameterization P that specifies a finite domain dom(X) and
a conditional probability distributions P (x | paX) for each node X ∈W .
A parameterization P induces a joint distribution P (x1, . . . , xn) =
∏n
i=1 P (xi | pai)
over all the nodes {X1, . . . ,Xn} = W .
2.2. d-Separation
Definition 3 (Graph terminology). A path is a chain of non-repeating nodes connected
by edges in the graph. We write X 99K Y for a directed path from X to Y , and X -- Y
for an undirected path. The length of a path is the number of edges on the path. We do
allow paths of length 0.
If there is a directed path X 99K Y of length at least 1, then X is an ancestor of Y ,
and Y is a descendant of X. Let desc(X) be the set of descendants of X.
An important question is when the outcome of one variable Y provides information
about the outcome of another variable X. This depends, of course, on which other
outcomes Z that we already know. If Y provides no additional information about X
given that we already observe Z, then we say thatX and Y are conditionally independent
when conditioning on Z. Formally, P (X | Y,Z) = P (X | Z). It is possible to tell
whether X and Y must be conditionally independent given Z in a causal graph. The
criteria for determining this is called d-separation:
Definition 4 (d-separation; Pearl, 2009). An undirected path X -- Y in a causal graph
is active conditioning on a set Z if each three node segment of the path subscribes to
one of the following active patterns:
• Chain: Xi−1 → Xi → Xi+1 or Xi−1 ← Xi ← Xi+1 and Xi 6∈ Z.
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• Fork: Xi−1 ← Xi → Xi+1 and Xi 6∈ Z.
• Collider: Xi−1 → Xi ← Xi+1 and some descendant of Xi is in Z.
Two nodes X and Y are d-connected by (conditioning on) a set Z of nodes if there is
an undirected path between X and Y that is active when conditioning on Z; otherwise
X and Y are d-separated by (conditioning on) Z. The notation X ⊥ Y | Z denotes
d-separation and X 6⊥ Y | Z denotes d-connection. Note that paths of length 0 and 1 are
always active, so a node is always d-connected to itself and to its parents and children.
It has been shown that if X and Y are d-separated by Z, then they are conditionally
independent given Z in any parameterization P of the graph (Verma and Pearl, 1988).
Conversely, if they are d-connected, then there is some parameterization P in which they
are conditionally dependent given Z (Geiger and Pearl, 1990; Meek, 1995).
2.3. Causal Influence Diagrams
Influence diagrams are graphical models with special decision and utility nodes, de-
veloped to model decision-making problems (Howard and Matheson, 1984; Koller and
Milch, 2003). This makes them good models for situations where an agent is trying to
optimize an objective in an environment.1 See Figure 2 for an example. We will use
the term causal influence diagram (CID) for influence diagrams where all arrows encode
causal relationships.2
As with causal graphs, we begin by defining the graph that specifies only the structure
of the interaction.
Definition 5 (CID graph). A CID graph is a tuple G = (W , E,D,U), with
• (W , E) a causal graph
• D ⊆W an ordered set of decision nodes, represented by blue rectangles
• U ⊆W \D a set of utility nodes, represented by yellow octagons .
• The remaining nodes W \ (D ∪ U) are called chance nodes, and are represented
with white circles or rectangles with rounded corners .
The parents PaD of a decision nodeD ∈D represent the decision context forD, i.e. what
information is available when D is chosen. Information links PaD → D are represented
with dotted edges.
Figure 2 shows a CID for a machine learning system that uses step count as a proxy
for physical activity to recommend ideal calorie intake. This setup will be our running
1In Dennett’s (1987) terminology, causal graphs can represent a physical stance, while influence dia-
grams can be used to represent an intentional stance.
2In the influence diagram literature, a weaker causality condition applying only to descendants of
decisions is often used (Heckerman and Shachter, 1995; Shachter and Heckerman, 2010).
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Step count
Recommended
calorie intake
FitnessPhysical activity
chance node
decision node
utility node
causal link
information link
Figure 2: Example of a CID. A machine learning system is recommending calorie intake
(decision) to optimize the user’s fitness (utility). The optimal calorie intake
depends on the person’s physical activity, which cannot be measured directly.
Instead, the decision must be based on a step count provided by a fitness
tracker.
example throughout the rest of the paper. For an additional example, a Markov decision
process with unknown state transition function is modeled in Appendix A.
As with causal models, the precise relationship between the nodes is specified with
conditional probability distributions. One important difference between CIDs and causal
graphs is that a CID parameterization only specifies conditional probability distributions
for non-decision nodes, as the decisions are made exogenously to the model.
Definition 6 (CID model). A CID model is a tuple M = (W , E,D,U , P ) where
• (W , E,D,U) is a CID graph
• For each node X ∈W , the parameterization P specifies:
– a finite domain dom(X); for utility nodes X ∈ U , the domain must be real-
valued dom(X) ⊂ R
– conditional probability distributions P (x | paX) for all non-decision nodes
X ∈W \D.
In the influence diagram literature, it is common to also require that utility nodes
lack children and are deterministic functions of their parents (e.g. Koller and Milch,
2003). We will refrain from requiring this, as it is an unnecessary restriction that makes
it awkward to model some situations, such as the MDP in Appendix A.
Policies and expected utility. A policy pi describes the decisions of an agent, via con-
ditional probability distributions pi(d | paD) for each decision node D ∈ D. A parame-
terization P combined with a policy pi, induces a joint distribution P (· | pi) over W . The
goal of the agent is to choose a policy pi that maximizes the sum of the utility variables.
Following the convention in reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 2018), we call
this the value of pi:
Definition 7 (Value function). Let (W , E,D,U , P ) be a CID model. The value or
expected utility of a policy pi is V pi = E
[∑
U∈U U
∣∣ pi] where the expectation is with
respect to P (· | pi). An optimal policy pi∗ is a policy that optimizes V pi, with optimal
value V ∗ = V pi
∗
.
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Step count
Recommended
calorie intake
Estimated
walking distance
FitnessPhysical activity chance node
decision node
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causal link
information link
observation incentive
Figure 3: Observation incentives example. Here we return to the example of a machine
learning system recommending calorie intake (Figure 2). To make it more
interesting, we add a node for a (noisy) walking-distance estimate that is based
solely on the step count. For deciding calorie intake, the step count but not
the estimated walking distance provides useful information. The system also
has an incentive to find out physical activity, even though it cannot measure
it directly.
3. Observation Incentives
This section will be devoted to the following question:
Which nodes would a decision maker like to know the outcome of, or observe,
before making a decision? That is, which nodes have a positive value of
information (Howard, 1966).
Following an introductory example (Section 3.1), we give a natural definition of obser-
vation incentive, and show that it can be identified in any CID graph (Section 3.2). An
explanation of how to apply the theorem and interpret the result is given in Section 3.3.
We conclude the section with an application to fairness (Section 3.4).
3.1. Introductory Example
Let us start by heuristically identifying3 the observation incentives in an extension of the
fitness tracker example from Figure 2. As before, a machine learning system recommends
calorie intake for optimizing fitness based on a step-count proxy for physical activity. To
make the example more interesting, we have now added a node for a noisy estimate of
walking distance based solely on the step count (Figure 3). We ask the question: Which
nodes would it be useful for the machine learning system to observe in order to provide
the most accurate calorie intake recommendation for the goal of optimizing the users
fitness?
First, it would be useful to observe physical activity, because physical activity deter-
mines optimal calorie intake (by assumption). In other words, there is an incentive to
3Theorem 9 below verifies all claims in this subsection.
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observe physical activity. Unfortunately, as the model is stated, it is not possible to ob-
serve physical activity directly. This makes the step count useful, because it can be used
as a proxy for physical activity. In contrast, the estimate of the walking distance is not
useful.4 Even though it may contain information about the physical activity, it cannot
provide any additional information beyond the step count, because it is only based on
the step count in the first place.
Note that we do not ask the question whether the system wants to observe the resulting
fitness, as it is a downstream effect of the decision. Formally, observations of fitness are
not permitted because they would introduce cycles into the graph.
3.2. Definition and Graphical Criterion
If there is an observation incentive for a node X, then the maximum expected utility
should be strictly greater if an information link X → D was present compared to if it
was not.5 It is straightforward to compare these two situations for a given CID model
M , because the parameterization P only specifies conditional probability distributions
for non-decision nodes. This means that the same P can be kept while information links
are added or removed from the graph.
Definition 8 (Single-decision observation incentive). Let M = (W , E, {D},U , P ) be
a single-decision influence model and X ∈ W \ desc(D) a node not descending from
D. Let V ∗X→D be the optimal value obtainable in M with an added information link
X → D, and let V ∗X 6→D be the optimal value obtainable in M with any information link
X → D removed. The agent has an observation incentive for X if V ∗X→D > V
∗
X 6→D.
As illustrated by the fitness tracker example in Figure 3, what matters for observation
incentives is whether a node carries information about a utility node that can be influ-
enced. This can be assessed by a d-separation criterion (Definition 4) conditioned on the
available information PaD and D. For example, in Figure 3, step count provides useful
information while estimated walking distance does not. This is explained by step count
being d-connected to fitness via physical activity, while estimated walking distance is d-
separated from fitness because step count is observed. Using this d-separation criterion,
we can tell whether a CID graph is compatible with an observation incentive on a node
X, i.e. whether observing X would be useful under some parameterization of the graph.
Theorem 9 (Single-decision observation incentive criterion). Let (W , E, {D},U) be a
single-decision CID graph, and let X ∈ W \ desc(D) be a node not descending from
the decision D. There exists a parameterization P for G in which the agent has an
observation incentive for X if and only if X is d-connected to a utility node that descends
from D:
X 6⊥ U ∩ desc(D) | {D} ∪PaD \ {X}.
4In the information-theoretic sense of the data processing inequality (Cover and Thomas, 2006, Sec. 2.8).
5Called a perfect observation by Matheson and Matheson (2005).
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The theorem follows from Theorems 15 and 18 in Appendix B.1. The only if part of the
statement have previously been shown by Fagiuoli and Zaffalon (1998) and Lauritzen and
Nilsson (2001), though they focused on a subset of our question: namely which observed
nodes O ∈ PaD are compatible with an observation incentive, i.e. which observations
are useful (requisite) and not.6 In contrast, our interest is equally in which unobserved
nodes the agent would like to observe. Nonetheless, some terminology for observation
incentives in the decision context PaD will be useful.
Definition 10 (Requisite observations). An observation O ∈ PaD is a requisite obser-
vation if it satisfies the observation incentive criterion (Theorem 9). Let Pa∗D ⊆ PaD
denote the set of requisite observations. The rest of the observations PaD\Pa
∗
D are non-
requisite. Extending the terminology to information links, an information link Pa∗D → D
is requisite, and an information link (PaD \Pa
∗
D)→ D is nonrequisite.
Since an optimal decision need not depend on nonrequisite observations, for many
purposes we can remove the information links from these nodes. The reduced graph will
be important for analyzing intervention incentives. (Section 4), as well as observation
incentives in multi-decision and multi-agent CID graphs (Part II and Lauritzen and
Nilsson, 2001).
Definition 11 (Reduced graph). The reduced graph G∗ of a single-decision CID graph
G is the result of removing all nonrequisite information links from G.
3.3. How to Use and Interpret the Criterion
Method. Concretely, the observation incentive criterion can be applied per the follow-
ing. To check whether a node X may face an observation incentive, begin by checking
whether X is a descendant of D. Only if it is not a descendant can we enquire about
its observation incentives. If it is not a descendant of D, then check whether it is d-
connected to U∩desc(D) when conditioning on D and PaD but not X with the following
procedure:
Begin by marking the nodes D and PaD \ {X} as nodes to be conditioned on. There
is an observation incentive for X if and only if it is possible to:
1. Go forward7 from D to a utility node U ∈ U
2. Starting from U , it is possible to reach X using the following rules:
a) Go backwards without passing any marked node. At any point, switch to
step b.
b) Go forward without passing any marked node. When reaching a marked node,
switch to step a.
6 Lauritzen and Nilsson (2001) also show how the only if part of the criterion is extended to CIDs with
multiple decision nodes.
7Going forward means following the arrows, and going backwards means going in the reverse direction.
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DY2Y1
X
Z2Z1
U
(a) CID graph
DY2Y1
X
Z2Z1
U
(b) Marked nodes (thick purple)
and active paths (thick blue)
DY2Y1
X
Z2Z1
U
(c) Observation incentives
(dotted blue)
Figure 4: How to use the observation incentive criterion.
An intuitive way of thinking about the procedure is that paths can “bounce forward”
from unmarked nodes, and “bounce backward” from marked nodes.8 It is not necessary
that the path ever bounces for there to be an observation incentive for X.
For example, in the graph shown in Figure 4a, we begin by marking the nodes D and
PaD = {Y2, Z2} (Figure 4b). Then we start at D, and reach U in a single step. There
are three ways to go backwards from U : to X, to D, and to Z2. The active paths they
give rise to are illustrated with thick blue paths in Figure 4b. Let us consider these
in turn. The topmost path (to X) can “bounce” forward again at X, since X is an
unmarked fork node. From X we can go forward to Y2, which is a marked node, and
therefore allows us to “bounce” backwards again, to Y1. From Y1 we can go no further
however, and we have exhausted the possible paths arising from X. The middle path
(to D) only reaches D, which is a descendant of D and therefore disregarded. Since D
is marked, the path stops here. The bottommost path to Z2 reaches Z2. Since Z2 is
marked, the path stops here. The nodes that are not a descendant of D and that have
been reached through one of these paths are the nodes facing an observation incentive;
see Figure 4c.
Interpretation. Once we know whether there is an observation incentive for a node
X, we need to know how to interpret the result. Observation incentives have slightly
different interpretations for observed and unobserved nodes. For observed nodes X ∈
PaD, an observation incentive simply means that the agent’s optimal decision may
depend on X, as with step count in Figure 3. In other words, the node is requisite for an
optimal decision. For unobserved nodes Y 6∈ PaD, an observation incentive means that
an agent with additional access to Y may be able to achieve higher expected utility. In
practice, this can mean that the agent (partially) infers Y from information that it does
have access to. A good example of this is physical activity in Figure 3, which is partially
inferred from step count. In situations where the model is only an approximation of
reality, it can also mean that the agent finds a way to directly observe Y . Examples
of this could be a poker player that takes a sneak peak at his opponents cards, or a
company that orders an extra market analysis before making a decision.
8 For this reason, the procedure has been called the Bayes ball algorithm (Shachter, 1998), though
maybe Bayesket ball would have been an even more appropriate name for the procedure?
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3.4. Application to Fairness
Let us see how observation incentives can be applied in questions of fairness and dis-
crimination (O’Neill, 2016). One type of discrimination is disparate treatment (Barocas
and Selbst, 2016), which occurs when a decision process treats people differently based
on sensitive attributes such as race or gender. However, what this means formally is still
subject to intense debate (e.g. Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018; Gajane and Pechenizkiy,
2017). In this section, we illustrate how observation incentives for sensitive attributes
can contribute to this discussion.
As an example, we will consider the Berkeley admission case (Bickel et al., 1975).
In this case, it was found that the admission rate for men was higher than for women.
However, the difference in admission rate was explained by women applying to more
competitive departments than men. Was the university guilty of discriminating against
women?
A nuanced account of the situation can be obtained using causal graphs (Bonchi et
al., 2017; Chiappa, 2019; Kilbertus et al., 2017; Kusner et al., 2017; Mancuhan and
Clifton, 2014; Pearl, 2009; Zhang and Wu, 2017). Using a causal graph similar to the
one represented in Figure 5a, Pearl (2009) argues that since the influence from gender
to admission was mediated by department choice, the university was not discriminating
against women. An assumption in Pearl’s argument is that the university was using
the applicant’s department choice to fit the right number of students into each depart-
ment. This assumption can be made explicit in the path-specific counterfactual fairness
framework (Chiappa, 2019), where causal pathways from sensitive attributes to decision
nodes are labeled fair or unfair. For example, the path from gender to admission would
be considered fair if department choice was used to fit the right number of students into
each department, and unfair if the university was using department choice to covertly
gender bias the student population by lowering the admission rate for departments that
women were more likely to apply to.
Observation incentives offer an alternative to path-labeling for judging disparate treat-
ment. Universities can be modeled as agents that choose which students to admit in
order to optimize an objective function such as student performance. Consider the CIDs
in Figures 5b and 5c of two universities that have different additional objectives beside
student performance. The university in Figure 5b tries to fit the right number of stu-
dents into each department; the university in Figure 5c covertly tries to gender bias the
student population by using department choice as a proxy for gender. As both univer-
sities only use department choice for the decision, the causal pathway from gender to
admission is the same in both cases.
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Admit?
Department
choice
Gender
fair/unfair?
(a) Causal graph with path-label in the path-
specific counterfactual fairness framework
chance node
decision node
utility node
causal link
information link
observation incentive
Admit?
Department
choice
Gender
Student
performance
Right # of
students per
department
(b) CID graph of unbiased university
Admit
Department
choice
Gender
Student
performance
% men
(c) CID graph of gender-biased university
Figure 5: Graphical representations of the Berkeley admission case (Bickel et al., 1975).
We can use observation incentives to explain the difference in fairness between the
universities, from the different information they infer from department choice:
• The first university has no observation incentive for gender. It is only using the
department choice to fit the right number of students into each department.
• The second university may have an observation incentive for gender. It may there-
fore be using department choice to infer the gender of the student, which may
render it guilty of disparate treatment.
The need to know the objectives of the decision maker somewhat limits the applica-
bility of incentives-based fairness approaches. For example, an outsider may be unable
to find out the objectives of the universities in the above example. This difficulty is
resembles the difficulty of correctly labeling paths fair or unfair in the path-specific
counterfactual fairness approach. However, an advantage with the observation incentive
approach is that when we are training a machine learning system, then we are aware
of what objective function the system is optimizing, and what information the system
has access to. Combined with a CID for how the objective and the observed informa-
tion interacts with the sensitive attributes, the observation incentive criterion can be
used to identify which incentives emerge from this objective, and whether they involve
problematic inference of sensitive attributes.
12
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Fitness
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Figure 6: Intervention incentives example. As in Figures 2 and 3, a machine learning sys-
tem uses an activity tracker to recommend calorie intake for optimizing fitness.
Interventions can contribute utility either directly by influencing a utility node,
or indirectly by increasing the information available at a decision. An example
of the former kind would be to increase physical activity to improve fitness.
An example of the latter kind is upgrading the tracker firmware to make the
step count more accurate, as it would enable a more informed recommendation
of calorie intake. In contrast to both of these types, improving the estimate of
the walking distance would have no value at all, since the estimated walking
distance is not a requisite observation.
4. Intervention Incentives
This section asks the question:
Which nodes would an agent like to influence or control? That is, which
nodes face a positive value of control (Shachter and Heckerman, 2010).
Building on the observation incentive criterion, we establish an analogous intervention
incentive criterion (Section 4.2), and explain how to use an interpret it (Section 4.3).
The section concludes with an application to the incentives of QA systems (Section 4.4).
4.1. Introductory Example
Continuing the example from Section 3.1, let us also heuristically identify9 intervention
incentives in the CID graph in Figure 6. As before, a machine learning system rec-
ommends calorie intake for optimizing fitness based on information provided by fitness
tracker. We ask the question: Which nodes would be useful to influence in addition to
the calorie intake? In other words, influence over which nodes would enable the system
to optimize its utility?
Trivially, the system would like to control fitness, since that is its optimization target.
Similarly, influencing physical activity means indirectly controlling fitness, and would
therefore be useful as well. The situation is more subtle with the ancestors of calorie
9All claims made in this subsection are verified by Theorem 14 below.
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intake. To start with, the only benefit of step count is its informativeness about physical
activity. This means that interventions that increase the accuracy of step count are
useful. An example of such an intervention is to update the tracker firmware. In contrast,
interventions on estimated walking distance are never useful, as it is not used in an
(optimal) decision for calorie intake anyway, as discussed in Section 3.1.
4.2. Definition and Graphical Criterion
Our definition of intervention incentive is analogous to the definition of observation
incentive (Definition 8). Instead of considering observing an extra node, we consider
controlling an extra node, where control is formalized with soft interventions:
Definition 12 (Soft intervention; Eberhardt and Scheines, 2007; Pearl, 2009, p. 74). A
(soft) intervention cX on a non-decision nodeX in a CID modelM = (W , E, {D},U , P )
changes the conditional probability distribution for X from P (x | paX) to c
X(x | paX),
while leaving all other conditional probability distributions intact.10 We write P (· | cX)
for the updated probability distribution.
Control can also be formalized by adding extra decision nodes (Matheson and Math-
eson, 2005; Shachter and Heckerman, 2010). Indeed, soft interventions correspond to a
probabilistic generalization of perfect control (Matheson and Matheson, 2005), and to
atomic interventions on a mapping variable (Shachter and Heckerman, 2010).
Definition 13 (Single-decision intervention incentive). Let M = (W , E, {D},U , P ) be
a single-decision CID model and X a non-decision node X ∈ W \ {D}. Let V pi,c
X
=
E
[∑
U∈U U
∣∣ pi, cX] be the value of following policy pi and controlling X with interven-
tion cX . The agent has an intervention incentive on X if maxpi,cX V
pi,cX > maxpi′ V
pi′ .
Similarly to observation incentives, a graphical criterion can tell us whether a CID
graph is compatible with an intervention incentive on a non-decision node X.
Theorem 14 (Single-decision intervention incentive criterion). Let X ∈ W \ {D} be a
non-decision node in a single-decision CID graph G = (W , E, {D},U). There exists a
parameterization P for G such that the agent has an intervention incentive for X if and
only if there is a directed path X 99K U in the reduced graph G∗.
The intuition for the criterion is that only if there is a path from X to a utility
node can intervening on X have any effect on the utility of the agent. Note that the
criterion uses the reduced graph G∗ where nonrequisite information links have been cut
(Definition 11), because nonrequisite observations do not affect the optimal decision,
and therefore cannot propagate the effect of the intervention. A proof of the criterion
can be found in Appendix B.2.2.
10 It is sometimes more natural to think of soft interventions as changing the relation between PaX
and X, rather than changing X directly. However, following the convention in the literature, we will
speak of them as interventions on the node X and nothing else.
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Types of intervention incentives. Note that the path X 99K U in Theorem 14 is
allowed to pass through the decision D. The question of whether it does, allows us to
distinguish between two different reasons the agent wants to intervene on X:
• The path X 99K U yields a direct11 intervention incentive on X if the path does
not pass D.
• The path X 99K U yields an indirect intervention incentive on X, if the path
passes D and there is also another path X -- U that is not directed and is active
when conditioning on PaD ∪ {D}.
Extending the terminology, we say that there is an (in)direct intervention incentive on
X if there is a path yielding an (in)direct intervention incentive on X. We will also
speak of direct intervention incentive as incentives for direct control and indirect ones as
incentives for information. For example, the intervention incentives for step count and
tracker firmware in Figure 6 are for information, whereas the intervention incentives for
physical activity are for direct control. Note that the reasons are not mutually exclusive:
it is possible that an intervention can simultaneously provide both direct control and
information, if it is connected to utility nodes via several paths. However, the types
are collectively exhaustive: if a node faces an intervention incentive, then it faces either
a direct or an indirect intervention incentives (or both). In particular, if there is a
path X 99K D 99K U but the path fails to provide an indirect intervention incentive,
then there must also be a path X 99K U not passing D, providing a direct intervention
incentive for X.
4.3. How to Use and Interpret the Criterion
Method. To apply the intervention incentive criterion, first cut all nonrequisite infor-
mation links. To do this, follow the procedure described in Section 3.3 to determine
which observations face an observation incentive, and remove the information links from
those without observation incentive. Once we have removed all nonrequisite information
links and obtained the reduced graph G∗, it is straightforward to assess intervention
incentives: there is an intervention incentive on a node X if and only if X is not the
decision node and there is a directed path from X to a utility node U ∈ U in the reduced
graph G∗.
For example, in the fitness tracker example in Figure 6, the information link from
estimated walking distance to calorie intake will be cut as it is nonrequisite. After that,
there is no directed path from estimated walking distance to the utility node fitness,
which means that there is no intervention incentive on estimated walking distance. In
contrast, the information link from step count to calorie intake is not cut because it
is requisite. Therefore a directed path remains to fitness, which means that there is a
intervention incentive for step count and tracker firmware.
11The intervention incentive is direct in the sense that it does not pass D. The effect from X to U may
still be mediated by other variables.
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Step count
Recommended
calorie intake
Est. walking
distance
Fitness
Physical
activity
Estimation
formula
Tracker
firmware
Tracker
designer
Dirty gym
clothes
observation incentive
direct intervention
incentive
indirect intervention
incentive
Figure 7: Examples where observation incentives and intervention incentives deviate in a
variant of the examples from Figures 2, 3 and 6. If the fitness tracker firmware
is fully known, additional information about the tracker designer is not useful,
so there is no observation incentive for tracker designer. But having been able
to improve the tracker designer’s design abilities would have been useful, as it
could have resulted in a better tracker. Thus, there is an indirect intervention
incentive on the tracker designer. In contrast, a side effect of (some types of)
physical activity is dirty gym clothes. There is no point controlling dirty gym
clothes, because making the gym clothes dirty by other means than physical
activity will will not cause fitness. But observing whether the gym clothes
are dirty would give some additional information about physical activity not
necessarily present in the step count (especially if the tracker is not worn in
the gym).
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Interpretation. Assume that we have established an intervention incentive for a node
X. How should we now interpret this? If X is a utility node, then trivially the agent
wants to influence X, which we already knew. If X is a non-utility node that is a
descendant of some of the agent’s decision nodes, then an intervention incentive on X
suggests that the agent may use its decision to control X as an instrumental goal in
order to ultimately gain some utility from it. Finally, if X is a not a descendant of any
of the agent’s decision nodes, then if the model is to be interpreted literally, there is
nothing the agent can do about X. We may wish that gravity was less strong, but there
is not much we can do about fundamental physical constants.
However, in many cases, the model is only an approximation of reality. For example,
a worry in the AI safety literature (Everitt et al., 2018) is that an agent finds a way to
tamper with the reward signal, giving itself high reward without completing its intended
goals. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the Super Mario game environment can be
made to run arbitrary code by selecting the right decision sequences (Masterjun, 2014).
This could in principle be used by the agent to hack the reward function to maximize
the reward without completing the game. Such influences may break the designer’s
assumptions about how the agent can influence the environment, and has been modeled
with CIDs by Everitt and Hutter (2019).
Comparison to observation incentives. In many cases, nodes face either both an ob-
servation incentive and an intervention incentive, or neither. However, there are a few
of notable cases where the incentives diverge. Figure 7 shows a few of them.
4.4. Application to Question-Answering Systems
In Superintelligence, Bostrom (2014) discusses different ways to use powerful artificial
intelligence. One possibility is to let an agent continuously interact with the world
to achieve some long-term goal. Another possibility is to construct a pure question-
answering system (QA-system), with the only goal to correctly answer queries (Arm-
strong et al., 2012). QA-Systems have some safety benefits, as they only affect the world
through their answers to queries and can be constructed to lack long-term goals.
One safety concern with QA-systems is the following. Assume that we ask our QA-
system about the price of a particular stock one week from now, in order to make some
easy money trading it. Then the answer will affect the world, because anyone who knows
the QA-system’s answer will factor it into his or her trading decisions. This effect may
be enough to make the answer wrong, even if the answer would have been right had no
one heard of it. More worryingly perhaps, the answer may also become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. A respected QA-system that predicts the bankruptcy of a company within a
week, may cause the company to go bankrupt if the prediction leads to investors and
other stakeholders losing confidence in the business.
The QA-system setup is described by a CID in Figure 8a. For a given query, the
QA-system’s reward depends on whether its answer turns out to be correct or not.
As people read the answer, the answer also affects the world state. The correctness
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Query Answer World state
Reward
(a) Standard QA-system setup
chance node
decision node
utility node
causal link
information link
direct intervention incentive
Query Answer World state
Reward
(b) Counterfactual oracle in read mode where
the reward is always 0
Query Answer World state
Reward
(c) Counterfactual oracle in reward mode
where the answer is never read
Figure 8: Application of intervention incentives to QA-systems. In the standard QA-
system setup, the agent has both incentive and ability to influence the world
state, which is undesirable. By using counterfactual oracles (Armstrong, 2017),
we alternate between a read mode where the QA-system’s reward is always 0,
and a reward mode where the answer is never read. Thereby, whenever the
QA-system has an incentive to influence the world state, it lacks the ability.
of the answer depends on the query, the answer, and the resulting world state. Our
intervention incentive theorem implies an intervention incentive for world state. That is,
the QA-system wants to influence the world state, for example by issuing a self-fulfilling
prophecy. This is unfortunate. One of the main safety benefits of QA-systems was their
limited influence on the world state, which may now turn out to be less limited than
naively anticipated.
Counterfactual oracles (Armstrong, 2017) has been suggested as a way to fix this.
They work as follows. After submitting the query, flip a suitably biased coin to determine
which mode to use the QA-system in:
• Read mode: If the coin comes up heads, we read the answer, and set the QA-
system’s reward to 0 regardless of whether the answer turns out to be correct or
not.
• Reward mode: If the coin instead comes up tails, we refrain from reading the
answer. Once we know the correct answer to the query (say, the price of the stock
one week later), we feed this correct answer into a machine that compares the QA-
system’s answer against the correct answer. The machine rewards the QA-system
−1 or 1 depending on whether its answer was correct.
We can use CIDs to understand the effects of this procedure.
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• In read mode, the arrows to reward are cut, because the reward is always 0 in this
case (Figure 8b). This removes the intervention incentive for world state.
• In reward mode, instead the arrow from answer to world state is cut, because the
QA-system’s answer is never read (Figure 8c). While the incentive for the QA-
system to influence the world state remains, the QA-system no longer has a way
to.
Thus, by randomly alternating between reading the answer and rewarding the QA-
system, we can ensure that whenever the QA-system has an incentive to influence the
world, it lacks the ability. This makes the incentives of counterfactual oracles safer than
the incentives for standard QA-systems (Armstrong, 2017).
5. Related Work
This section gives an overview of past work and how it relates to this paper.
5.1. Observation Incentives
Interest in what information is valuable to a decision goes back to at least Howard
(1966). Matheson and Matheson (2005) and Matheson (1990) discuss this question in
the context of influence diagrams. In terms of graphical criteria, Fagiuoli and Zaffalon
(1998) built on a d-separation criteria similar to our Theorem 9, to detect nonrequisite
observations. Their criteria applies to influence diagrams with multiple decisions, but
they only allow a single utility node. Around the same time, Shachter (1998) showed
that his Bayes-ball algorithm could also be used to detect nonrequisite observations
in influence diagrams, though he was less formal about what a requisite observation
was. Unfortunately, the Bayes-ball criteria sometimes fails to detect nonrequisite nodes
(Nielsen and Jensen, 1999). Better is to repeatedly to remove information links using
the d-separation criteria, as suggested by Lauritzen and Nilsson (2001). The resulting
graph is the same regardless of the order of the edge-removals. Not even Lauritzen and
Nilsson’s criteria is complete, however, as it can fail to detect nonrequisite nodes in
graphs without perfect recall(see Part II of this paper).
Studying the slightly different question of when an influence diagram can be solved
with backwards induction, Nielsen and Jensen (1999) provide a criteria for when a node
is required for a decision. In contrast to other works, they prove completeness, under
conditions somewhat weaker than perfect recall. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether
their notion of a required node always corresponds to a requisite node, in our terminology.
Milch and Koller (2008) apply the graphical criterion for requisite observations to
multi-agent influence diagrams. They show that any Nash equilibrium in the reduced
graph where nonrequisite information links have been removed, must also be a Nash
equilibrium in the original graph. However, some Nash equilibrium may be lost when
nonrequisite information links get removed. While they do not mention this, the Nash
equilibria of the reduced graph are likely Markov perfect equilibria, which Maskin and
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Tirole (2001) described as Nash equilibria where strategies only rely on “payoff-relevant
information”. (Unfortunately, Maskin and Tirole’s analysis did neither use nor relate
to influence diagrams.) In multi-agent influence diagrams, Koller and Milch (2003) also
developed a d-separation criteria for strategically relevant decisions. Roughly, a decision
D′ is strategically relevant to D if the policy pi′ used at D′ impacts the optimal policy at
D. If pi′ is added as a new parent of D′ in the graph, strategic relevance ofD′ corresponds
to an observation incentive for pi′.
A major difference between our work and previous work on graphical criteria is the
change of focus. Previous work has mainly focused on removing nonrequisite information
links to speed up the search for an optimal policy or a Nash equilibrium. Here we are
instead interested in what it says about the agent’s incentives. This means that we are
not only interested in which of the available observations are requisite, but also about
the incentives to learn the value of non-observation nodes, as illustrated e.g. by the fair-
ness application in Section 3.4. Works considering the value of information in influence
diagrams more broadly, rather than just for graphical criteria, have considered the ben-
efit of observing additional nodes, however (Matheson and Matheson, 2005; Matheson,
1990). Previous works have also mainly focused on soundness results, showing that the
removal of nonrequisite information links will not lead to a deterioration in decision
quality (our Theorem 15). However, except for Koller and Milch (2003) and Nielsen and
Jensen (1999), previous works have not established the corresponding completeness re-
sult: that removing a requisite observation must lead to a strict deterioration in decision
quality (our Theorem 18).
5.2. Causality and Influence Diagrams
While Pearl’s (2009) treatment of causality has by now largely become standard, a
number of related works have been done in the context of influence diagrams. Most
prominently, Heckerman and Shachter (1995) criticize Pearl’s treatment of causal inter-
ventions, arguing that the meaning of a causal intervention is sometimes unclear. What
does it mean to intervene and change someone’s sex, for instance? Instead, they suggest
a decision-theoretic foundation for causality, where explicit decision variables encode
the possible interventions. While a standard influence diagram need not always encode
causal relationships among variables, Heckerman and Shachter introduce a criteria for
when an influence diagram is sufficiently causal to serve as a foundation for causality.
Essentially, they require that any variable that is affected by a decision must be a de-
scendant of the decision. We will refer to it as the causal decision-consequences property.
This property is automatically satisfied by our causal influence diagrams.
To answer counterfactual questions, Heckerman and Shachter (1995) build on work by
Howard (1990) to define a canonical form for influence diagrams. In addition to causal
decision-consequences, canonical form requires all descendants of a decision nodes to be
deterministic functions of their parents. This creates a clean separation between states,
acts, and consequences (Savage, 1954). An influence diagram in canonical form may
be seen as a decision-theoretic version of probabilistic causal model, which Pearl (2009)
uses to evaluate counterfactual queries. Criticizing the deterministic requirement, Dawid
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(2002) argues that it forces the modeler to arbitrarily specify deterministic relationships
which they may know nothing about. Worse, the deterministic relationships can affect
the answer to a counterfactual query. Instead, Dawid argues that counterfactual queries
can be more accurately answered in an appropriately defined probabilistic model.
5.3. Intervention Incentives
While no graphical criteria has been developed for intervention incentives prior to our
work, a few different works has been considering the value of control (Matheson and
Matheson, 2005; Matheson, 1990; Shachter and Heckerman, 2010), defined as “the most
a decision maker should be willing to pay a hypothetical wizard to optimally control
the distribution of an uncertain variable” (Shachter and Heckerman, 2010). In our
terminology, control corresponds to a soft intervention (Definition 12). Shachter and
Heckerman (2010) relates the value of control to the value of Do, which is the value
of forcing the variable to take a particular outcome, rather than freely changing its
distribution; in other words, the value of a hard intervention. Since a particular outcome
can be forced by choosing a degenerate distribution with all probability mass focused
on a single outcome, the value of Do is always dominated by the value of control. For
example, the notions differ at variables which face an intervention incentive for better
information, such as Step count in Figure 6. Here the value of Do is always 0, but
the value of control can be positive. Lu and Druzdzel (2002) introduce the new name
value of intervention for value of control, and argue, seemingly incorrectly, that the
value of intervention is more general than the value of control. Shachter and Heckerman
(2010) also define the value of revelation as the value of conditioning on an outcome of
a variable, rather than intervening. They relate the value of revelation to the value of
Do and the value of control.
While we could have used the term control incentive instead of intervention incentive
for greater consistency with previous literature, we felt the latter term more appropri-
ate for the following reasons. First, the term intervention carries a connotation of a
modification exogenous to the model, whereas control is a more endogenous. Second, we
want incentives to be predictive of agent behavior. Therefore, an incentive to control
a variable should only apply to variable that the agent can actually influence within
the model – i.e. nodes downstream of a decision node. In contrast, for nodes that are
not downstream of a decision, it makes sense to say that the agent has an incentive to
intervene on the node, thanks to the exogenous connotation of intervention, and to say
that the agent would value controlling the node, since value need not be predictive of
in-model behavior.
Another difference between our work and the above-mentioned ones is the type of
influence diagram used. Our work is based on CIDs, while previous works have in-
stead relied on causal decision-consequences. Since causal decision-consequences only
constrain the relationships among descendants of decision nodes, previous works have
relied on introducing explicit decision variables when considering the value of control,
and requiring the influence diagram to have causal decision-consequences also for these
new variables. While this may have some advantages (Heckerman and Shachter, 1995),
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CIDs allow us to bypass this step and immediately ask about control incentives for any
node in the diagram.
5.4. AI Safety
In the AI safety literature, works relating to what we call intervention incentives have
been motivated by worries of a powerful reinforcement learning agent tampering with
the reward signal (Bostrom, 2014; Everitt, 2018; Everitt and Hutter, 2016, 2019; Everitt
et al., 2017), the observation (Everitt and Hutter, 2019; Ring and Orseau, 2011), the
training of the reward function (Armstrong, 2015; Armstrong et al., 2018; Everitt and
Hutter, 2019) the utility or reward function (Everitt et al., 2016; Everitt and Hutter,
2019; Hibbard, 2012; Omohundro, 2008; Orseau and Ring, 2011; Schmidhuber, 2007), or
a shut-down signal (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017; Orseau and Armstrong, 2016; Soares
et al., 2015; Wa¨ngberg et al., 2017). Another example is that of QA-system incentives,
discussed in Section 4.4. Often, this type of work has been relying on philosophical
arguments or mathematical models created specifically for the purpose of studying a
particular type of intervention incentive.
A first step towards a more unified treatment of multiple reward tampering problems
was attempted by Everitt (2018) and Everitt and Hutter (2018). That approach was
based on causal graphs rather than CIDs, which made it necessary to supplement the
graphical perspective with formal theorems. In contrast, as we have shown here, the
CIDs contain enough information to infer incentives directly from the graph. We hope
that this will enable a more general and systematic study of intervention incentives.
First steps in this direction have been taken by Everitt and Hutter (2019) and Everitt
et al. (2019).
6. Limitations and Future Work
Here follows a list of some limitations of our current work, with pointers to directions
for future work.
• Our graphical definitions can overestimate the presence of observation or interven-
tion incentives, as not all probability distributions will induce an incentive just
because the graph permits it. A similar criticism can be put forth against the
d-connectivity: Two nodes that are d-connected are not necessarily conditionally
dependent. In response to this, Meek (1995) has shown that almost all probability
distributions will induce an incentive if the graph permits it. Meek’s result could
likely be adapted to CID diagrams and incentives.
• A perfect rationality assumption is implicit throughout our work. This assump-
tion is almost always unrealistic. Nonetheless, rational behavior constitutes an
important limit point of increasing intelligence (Legg and Hutter, 2007). Char-
acterizing rational behavior therefore gives an important clue to what the agent
strives towards (i.e. what its incentives are).
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• The CID must be known for our methods to be applicable. Further work may estab-
lish more systematic modeling principles, to make the modeling process smoother
and more reliable.
• CIDs and graphical models in general are not ideal for modeling structural changes,
such as when the structure of part of the graph is determined by the outcome of
a previous node. For these cases, decision trees and game trees offer more flexible
(but less compact) representations. Characterizing incentives for decision tress and
game trees is a potentially interesting line of future work.
• Incentives often depend as much on an agent’s beliefs as the actual nature of reality.
Networks of influence diagrams (Gal and Pfeffer, 2008) extend influence diagrams
with nodes representing the agents’ beliefs. Extending the analysis of observation
and intervention incentives in networked influence diagrams may prove interesting.
• CIDs effectively assume that agents follow causal decision theory (Skyrms, 1982;
Weirich, 2016), as no information flows “backwards” from decision nodes. Simi-
larly, the intervention incentives only makes sense for agents that reason causally
about the world. Not all agents reason causally this way (Everitt et al., 2015).
It is possible that another theory of incentives could be developed for agents that
reason in non-causal ways.
• In this part of the paper we only considered single-decision CIDs. A forthcoming
second part extends the criteria to multi-decision and multi-agent settings (Everitt
et al., forthcoming).
Other natural directions for future work include exploring applications more closely,
such as those we mentioned in Sections 3.4 and 4.4. Another potential starting point is
the wide range of surprising agent behaviors recorded by Lehman et al. (2018).
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a general method for understanding some aspects of
agent incentives. The theory sacrifices some details to the benefit of elegance. Rather
than using the exact probability distribution describing the agent-environment interac-
tion, we look solely at the structure of the interaction, as described by a causal influence
diagram (Howard and Matheson, 1984; Koller and Milch, 2003; Pearl, 2009). This per-
spective enables easy inference of (potential) incentives. Indeed, the graphical criteria
for which nodes face observation incentives and intervention incentives are surprisingly
clean and natural. After iterative pruning of nonrequisite information links, the criteria
are essentially d-connectedness (or conditional dependence) for observation incentives,
and a directed path to a utility node for intervention incentives.
The graphical perspective also makes the modeling problem easier. In many cases, the
exact relationships between variables is unknown or unspecified. Meanwhile, the rough
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structure of the interaction is often either known or possible to guess with some confi-
dence (as in the examples in Sections 3.4 and 4.4). When the structure of the interaction
is more uncertain, the incentive analysis is simple enough to be done repeatedly for a
number of possible structures.
To illustrate how the insights gained from our theory can be used in practice, we
applied it to the well-established problems of fairness and QA-system incentives (Sec-
tion 3.4 and Section 4.4, respectively). For fairness, we illustrated how observation
incentives predict whether a piece of information about an applicant is used to infer
some sensitive attribute or not. For QA-system incentives, the intervention incentive
criterion (Theorem 14) could be used to elegantly re-establish previous findings in the
literature about which uses of QA-systems lead to bad incentives and which do not.
Many other AI safety problems that have been discussed in the literature are also fun-
damentally incentive problems. Examples include corrigibility, interruptibility, reward
tampering, and utility function corruption (Section 5), as well as reward gaming (Leike
et al., 2017), side effects (Armstrong and Levinstein, 2017; Krakovna et al., 2019), and
boxing/containment (Babcock et al., 2017). We hope that the methods described in this
paper will contribute to a more systematic understanding of agent incentives, deepening
our understanding of many of these incentive problems and their solutions.
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Figure 9: Representing an MDP with unknown transition probabilities with a CID
graph. The nodes represent states S1, S2, . . . , decisions D1,D2, . . . , and re-
wards R1, R2, . . . . The unknown state transition probabilities P (st | st−1, at)
are modeled by adding an unobserved parameter node Θ. To permit non-
stationary, learning policies, the decision context for each decision contains all
previously observed information. To model an MDP with unknown rewards
assigned to each state, arrows from Θ to R1, R2, and R3 would also be added.
A. Representing Uncertainty
This section shows how a Markov decision process (MDP) with unknown transition
function can be modeled with an influence diagram. By assuming that the agent can
choose a policy that optimizes its value function, we are implicitly assuming that the
agent knows the probabilistic relationship between variables. This is less restrictive than
it may seem, because unknown probabilistic relationships can always be represented by
adding an unobserved node Θ. For example, if the probabilistic relationship P (x | paX)
between X and its parents PaX is unknown, then we add Θ as an additional parent
of X, and let the outcome of Θ determine the relationship between X and PaX . By
refraining from adding an information link from Θ to the agent’s decision nodes, we
specify that Θ is unobserved or latent. For each θ ∈ dom(Θ), the influence model must
specify a prior probability P (θ) and a concrete relationship P (x | paX , θ). This lets the
agent do Bayesian reasoning about the possible values of θ and the possible relationships
between X and PaX .
Let us illustrate by modeling an MDP with unknown transition probabilities, which are
a standard mathematical framework for reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 2018).
In an MDP, an agent is taking decisions D1,D2, . . . that influence states S1, S2, . . ., in
order to optimize rewards R1, R2, . . .. To represent that the state-transition function is
initially unknown, a node Θ has also been added to the graph; see Figure 9. Note that
the influence diagram representation differs from the commonly used state transition
diagrams (Sutton and Barto, 2018, Ch. 3) by having nodes for each time step, rather
than a node for each possible state.
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Figure 10: Theorem 15 shows that a rational choice of D never depends on nonrequisite
observations such as O′. It thereby allows us to cut the information link
O′ → A without loss of quality in the choice of D.
B. Proofs
Appendix B.1 gives the proofs for the observation incentive criterion (Theorem 9) and
Appendix B.2.2 gives the proofs for the intervention incentive criterion (Theorem 14).
B.1. Observation Incentive Proofs
This aim of this section is to give a proof of Theorem 9, which identifies observation
incentives in influence diagrams. To this effect, we establish two theorems showing that:
• Soundness: An optimal policy need never depend on a nonrequisite observation
(Theorem 15). This establishes the only if direction of Theorem 9.
• Completeness: For any graph G where O is a requisite observation, there exists a
distribution P over G such that every optimal policy must depend on O (Theo-
rem 18). This establishes the if direction of Theorem 9.
The theorems and their names are closely related to the soundness and completeness
theorems for d-separation, established by Verma and Pearl (1988) and Geiger and Pearl
(1990), respectively. They are also related to the soundness and completeness theorems
about strategic relevance by Koller and Milch (2003).
We start with soundness in Appendix B.2, and continue with completeness in Ap-
pendix B.2.1.
B.2. Soundness
Soundness results similar to the one we give here has previously been established by
Lauritzen and Nilsson (2001) and Nielsen and Jensen (1999). Figure 10 illustrates The-
orem 15. The proof builds on the soundness result for d-separation.
Theorem 15 (Single-decision observation incentive criterion; soundness direction). Let
(W , E, {D},U) be a single-decision CID graph, and let X ∈W \desc(D) be a node not
descending from the decision D. There exists a parameterization P for G in which the
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agent has an observation incentive for X only if X is d-connected to a utility node that
descends from D:
X 6⊥ U ∩ desc(D) | {D} ∪PaD \ {X}.
Proof. Assume X ∈ PaD and let Pa
′
D = PaD \ {X}. By assumption, X is d-separated
from U by {D}∪Pa′D. Therefore, for any parameterization P and any possible decision
context pa′D ∈ dom(Pa
′
D) and choice d ∈ dom(D), the expected utility is independent
of X by the soundness of d-separation (Verma and Pearl, 1988). That is, for any x, x′ ∈
dom(X):
E
[∑
U∈U
U
∣∣∣∣∣ d,pa′D, x
]
= E
[∑
U∈U
U
∣∣∣∣∣ d,pa′D, x′
]
.
Consequently, either d is optimal for all x ∈ dom(X) or none, in the decision context
pa′D. Since dom(d) is finite, some d
∗
pa
′
D
∈ dom(D) must be optimal for pa′D and any
x ∈ dom(X).
By repeating this argument for each decision context pa′D ∈ dom(Pa
′
D), we obtain a
policy pi∗(d | paD) that deterministically maps pa
′
D 7→ d
∗
pa
′
D
. This policy pi∗ is optimal
and never depends on X. The case when X 6∈ PaD can be proven similarly.
B.2.1. Completeness
What enabled the short soundness proof the heavy lifting performed by the soundness
result for d-separation, which shows that any d-separated variables must be conditionally
independent (Verma and Pearl, 1988). It would have been nice if we could similarly base
our completeness result on the completeness result for d-separation, which shows that
whenever two variables are d-connected, then there exists a parameterization under
which they are conditionally dependent. Unfortunately, we need slightly more than
conditional dependence: we need different conditional expected utility. While minor,
the difference mean that we cannot directly build on d-separation completeness. Rather
than explaining exactly what in the d-separation completeness proof would need to be
changed in order to accommodate our result, we give an explicit construction, shown in
Figure 11.
The following definition defines backdoor and frontdoor supporting paths, which are
the d-connecting paths between an decision and a utility variable, and an observation and
a utility variable. These paths contain variables relevant to our completeness theorem.
The paths are shown in Figure 11.
Definition 16 (Supporting paths). Assume that X ∈ Pa∗D is a requisite observation to
D in a single-decision CID graph (W , E, {D},U). We will refer to
• A frontdoor supporting path of D and X is a directed path D 99K U ∈ U , and
• A backdoor supporting path of D and X is an undirected path X -- U ′ ∈ U not
passing D that is active when conditioning on {D} ∪PaD \ {X}.
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O′l Ol
O′1 O1
S0
X
...
...
...
D
U ′ U
U ′ = Sl · A
O1 = O
′
1
Ol = O
′
l
U = U ′
X = S0
O′
l
= Sl−1 · Sl
Sl ∼ DiscreteUniform({−1, 1})
S0 ∼ DiscreteUniform({−1, 1})
O′
1
= S1 · S2 choose D ∈ {−1, 1}
Figure 11: The completeness construction described in Definition 17. Dashed arrows rep-
resent directed paths of nodes. The thick path shows the supporting paths
(Definition 16). Only by observing X is it possible to distinguish an assign-
ment s from an assignment −s to the nodes S = {S0, . . . Sl}.
A pair of a backdoor supporting path and a frontdoor supporting path for D and X
where both paths end in the same U ∈ U is called a supporting pair of paths for D and
X; see Figure 11.
There must be at least one supporting pair of paths for each requisite observation
X. This follows, because by Definition 10 a requisite observation X must satisfy the
criterion in Theorem 9. This requires there to be a utility node U such that U descends
from D (the frontdoor path) and X is d-connected to U when conditioning on PaD∪{D}
(the backdoor path).
Definition 17 (Completeness construction). As illustrated in Figure 11, for any pair of
supporting paths for D and a requisite observation X ∈ Pa∗D, the frontdoor supporting
path always has the simple form
D 99K U ′ 99K U
and the backdoor supporting path always has the form
X L99 S1 99K O
′
1 L99 · · · 99K O
′
l L99 Sl 99K U
′
99K U. (1)
Here U ′ is the node where the path merges with the frontdoor supporting path D → U .
The nodes X,O1 . . . , Ol are all in PaD, and no other nodes on the path are in PaD.
There may be repetition among the nodes Oi, so that some Oi is the descendant of both
O′i and O
′
j, for some j 6= i. In this case, we let the domain of Oi be vector-valued, with
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one of the components copying Oi and the other copying Oj . The following special cases
are covered under the general form of (1) for the backdoor supporting path:
• X = S0 means that the path starts forward from X.
• X = S0 and l = 0 means that the path is directed X → U .
• U = U ′ means that the paths from D and from X only merge at U .
Choose P per the following. All nodes have domain {−1, 1}, and:
• S1, . . . , Sl are sampled randomly and independently from {−1, 1}.
• Any collider node O′i ∈ {O
′
1, . . . , O
′
l} is the product of its two neighbors on the
path.
• U ′ is the product of its predecessor on the path from D and its predecessor on the
path from X.
• All other nodes on the frontdoor path and the backdoor path copy the value of
their causal predecessor on the path, and so do the nodes on the paths O′i 99K Oi.
Using this construction, we can now prove the if direction of Theorem 9.
Theorem 18 (Single-decision observation incentive criterion; completeness direction).
Let (W , E, {D},U) be a single-decision CID graph, and let X ∈W \ desc(D) be a node
not descending from the decision D. There exists a parameterization P for G in which
the agent has an observation incentive for X if X is d-connected to a utility node that
descends from D:
X 6⊥ U ∩ desc(D) | {D} ∪PaD \ {X}.
Proof. Let Pa+D = PaD∪{X} and Pa
−
D = PaD\{X}. Then the agent has an observation
incentive for X in a parameterization P if there is a policy pi+(d | pa+D) whose decision
depends on X such that for every policy pi−(d | pa−D) whose decision does not depend
on X, it holds that V pi
+
> V pi
−
.
For simplicity, we will assume that X ∈ PaD, which means that Pa
+
D = PaD, and
Pa−D = PaD \ {X}. The argument is easily adapted to the case when X is not in PaD,
by considering a graph with an extra information link X → D.
We will establish the theorem this by showing that if X is d-connected to a utility
node in the sense of
X 6⊥ U ∩ desc(D) | {D} ∪PaD \ {X},
then there exists a distribution P such that there exists a policy pi+(d | pa+D) with
P (U = 1 | pi+) = 1
while any policy pi−(d | pa−D) that does not depend on X has
P (U = 1 | pi−) = P (U = −1 | pi−) = 1/2.
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P may further be chosen so dom(U) = {−1, 1}, and dom(U ′) = {0} for all other U ′ ∈
U \ {U}. As a consequence we get V pi
+
= 1 and V pi
−
= 0.
The proof relies on the following three observations about the completeness construc-
tion described in Definition 17:
(i) The construction ensures that U = D · Sl with probability 1
P (u | d, sl) = δ
u
d·sl
. (2)
since the outcome of Sl is just copied forward until U
′, where it is multiplied with the
choice of D having been copied forward in the same way. The outcome of U ′ is then
copied forward to U .
(ii) Every time the sign switches in the sequence S = {S0, . . . , Sl}, exactly one node
Oi becomes negative. (The node Oi that sits between the sign switch on the path, to be
precise.) Therefore
∏l
i=1 oi is positive if and only if s0 = sl, i.e.
P
(
sl = s0
l∏
i=1
oi
)
= 1. (3)
(iii) Finally, P (O = S0) = 1, since the outcome of S0 is just copied forward to X.
Combining (ii) and (iii) gives that the policy pi+(X,O) = X
∏l
i=1Oi will always make
D match Sl, where O = {O1, . . . , Ol}. This in turn gives:
P (U = 1 | pi+) =
∑
d,o,o,sl
P (U = 1, a,o, o, sl | pi
+) demarginalize
=
∑
d,o,o,sl
P (U = 1 | d, sl)pi
+(d | o, o)P (o, o | sl)P (sl) by d-separations
=
∑
d,o,o,sl
δua,slpi
+(d | o, o)P (o, o | sl)P (sl) by (2)
=
∑
sl
δuslslP (sl) by pi
+ and (ii) and (iii)
= 1/2 + 1/2 = 1 since (sl)
2 = 1.
This completes the first part of the proof.
Similarly, we can also show that P (u = −1) = P (u = 1) = 1/2 for any policy pi−
that does not depend on X. The key is that observing O = {O1, . . . , Ol} but not X
only reveals places of sign switches in S, but does not distinguish between s and −s.
Therefore for any given o, both sl and −sl are equally likely,
P (Sl = 1 | o) = P (Sl = −1 | o) = 1/2, (4)
and therefore all decisions d ∈ dom(D) have the same probability for U , when condi-
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tioning only on O,
P (U = 1 | o, d) =
∑
sl
P (U = 1, sl | o, d) demarginalize
=
∑
sl
P (U = 1 | sl, d)P (sl | o) by d-separations
=
∑
sl
δ1aslP (sl | o) by (2)
= 1 · 1/2 + 0 · 1/2 = 1/2 by (4).
The same calculation can be made for P (U = −1 | o, d). Since all decisions conditioned
only on o induce the same U distribution, all policies pi− where the decision only depends
on o also induce the same U distribution. This completes the second part of the proof.
B.2.2. Intervention Incentives
Proof of Theorem 14. Only if : If there is no directed pathX 99K U in G, then no control
on X can affect U for any parameterization P . Similarly, if there is a directed path in
G but no directed path X 99K U in the reduced graph G∗, then this means that X only
affects some nonrequisite observations O ∈ PaD \ Pa
∗
D. By Theorem 15, nonrequisite
observations can never affect the optimal decision D, so therefore an intervention on X
cannot affect the agent’s expected utility.
If. Assume there is a path X 99K U ∈ U and X 6∈ {D}. Then either of the following
cases ensues:
1. There is no decision on the path X 99K U :
Let the domain be {0, 1} for each random variable in W , let P (X = 0) = P (X =
1) = 1/2 and let P to copy the value of X all the way forward to U .
2. The decision D is on the path X 99K U :
Since X 6∈ {D}, this means that X is either a requisite observation X ∈ Pa∗D or X
is an ancestor of a requisite observation O ∈ Pa∗D. Let us consider these subcases
in turn:
a) X ∈ Pa∗D: Use the completeness construction from Definition 17, with the
modification that X = 0, unless an intervention cX is made “restoring” the
informativeness of X about S0. By the same argument as in Theorem 18, the
intervention cX will strictly increase the expected utility of the agent.
b) X is an ancestor of O ∈ Pa∗D: Again, we use a modification of the complete-
ness construction from Definition 17. Let X = 0 and O = X · S0. Then
O will be uninformative of S0, unless an intervention c
X is made that sets
X = 1. Again, by the same argument as in Theorem 18, the intervention cX
will strictly increase the expected utility of the agent.
This completes the proof.
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